Abstract-Recently, Hwang et al. introduced a knapsack type public-key cryptosystem. They proposed a new algorithm called permutation combination algorithm. By exploiting this algorithm, they attempt to increase the density of knapsack to avoid the low-density attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
N 1976, Diffie and Hellman [3] introduced the notion of the public-key cryptography. Until that time, most public-key cryptosystems (PKC) fall into one of the two below categories [1] :
• Public-key cryptosystems based on hard numbertheoretic problems: e.g., RSA [13] , ElGamal [4] and ….
• Public-key cryptosystems based on subset sum or subset product problems: e.g., Merkle-Hellman [9] , Chor-Rivest [1] , Morri-Kasahara [11] , Naccache-Stern [12] ,… . Unlike hard number-theoretic problems, the knapsack problem has been proven to be NP-complete [10] . That is, there is no polynomial algorithm will be invented to solve the knapsack problem.
Since its Merkle-Hellman proposal, knapsack PKCs had been widely studied, and many knapsack-based PKCs were developed. There is no question that knapsack PKCs still warrant continuous researches, as a result of the NPcompleteness nature, the faster speed and a desire to have a wide variety of available cryptosystems. Nowadays, researchers reconsider knapsack public-key cryptography also because Shor [15] showed that integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems can be easily solved by using quantum computers. Therefore, traditional PKC schemes based on the two problems cannot be used to provide privacy protections any longer, and PKC schemes secure in quantum computing environment are needed to be developed. Although the underlying problem is NP-complete, but almost all knapsack cryptosystems were shown insecure in that they are vulnerable to some known attacks such as: low density attack [2, 6 ], Shamir's attack [14] and diophantine approximation attack [17] . This vulnerability is due to the special structure of the private key and the mathematical methods that public key (public knapsack) was built from the private key.
In this paper, we analyze security of the Hwang et al. cryptosystem [5] . We show that due to similarity of the key generation algorithm of their scheme with the basic MerkelHellman cryptosystem, we can use Shamir's attack to obtain equivalent private keys.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly explain subset sum problem and the basic Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem. Then, in Section 3, we review the Shamir's attack. Hwang et al.'s knapsack cryptosystem will be presented in Section 4 and cryptanalysis of this system will be given in Section 5.
II. THE SUBSET SUM PROBLEM AND THE BASIC MERKLE-HELLMAN CRYPTOSYSTEM
The subset sum problem is stated as follows: given a set of positive integers (ܽ ଵ , . . . , ܽ ) and positive integer ‫.ݏ‬ Whether there is a subset of the ܽ s that sums to ‫.ݏ‬ This is equivalent to determine whether there are variables ‫ݔ(‬ ଵ , . . . , ‫ݔ‬ ) such that
He also selects a permutation ߨ of ሼ1, 2, . . . , ݊ሽ and then transforms the easily solved knapsack ‫ܤ‬ into trapdoor knapsack (ܽ ଵ , . . . , ܽ ) via the relation
The public key is (ܽ ଵ , . . . , ܽ ) and the private key is ሼ(ܾ ଵ , ܾ ଶ , . . . , ܾ ), ܹ, ܲ, ߨሽ. 
III. SHAMIR ATTACK ON BASIC MERKLE-HELLMAN KNAPSACK CRYPTOSYSTEM
In 1982, Adi Shamir [14] shows that modular multiplication cannot perfectly hide the superincreasing sequence (private key), and hence, all the equation of the form
can be solved in polynomial time. This approach originates with Shamir [14] although we follow the presentation of Lagarias [7] .
Such as Hwang et al.'s knapsack cryptosystem [5] , we assume that no permutation is used. Hence equation (1) can be written as follows:
This means that for 1 ≤ ݅ ≤ ݊, there exists some integers ݇ such that ܽ ܷ − ݇ ‫‬ = ܾ and 0 ≤ ݇ < ܽ . Hence,
Since the ܾ s are superincreasing we have ܾ < ‫2/‬ ି and so
In particular, the right side of ‫/ܷ‬ − ݇ ଵ /ܽ ଵ < 1/(ܽ ଵ 2 ିଵ ) is very small. Hence we can assume ‫/ܷ‬ ≈ ݇ ଵ /ܽ ଵ .
We now observe that to break the basic Merkle-Hellman knapsack it is sufficient to find any pair (ܷ′, ‫)′‬ of positive integers such that ܷ′ܽ mod ‫′‬ is a superincreasing sequence (or similar enough to a superincreasing sequence that one can solve the subset sum problem). We show that if
Subtracting the case ݅ = 1 of equation (2) from the ݅-th gives
and so, for 2 ≤ ݅ ≤ ݊,
Taking ‫′‬ = ܽ ଵ and ܷ′ = ݇ ଵ then ܷ′ܽ mod ‫′‬ is very close to a superincreasing sequence. Since ܽ ଵ is public, It remains to compute the integer ݇ ଵ such that equation (3) holds, given only the integers ܽ ଵ , . . . , ܽ . Another way to write equation (3) is
and one sees that the problem is precisely simultaneous diophantine approximation. We can use lattice based reduction algorithm for solving simultaneous diophantine approximation. Performing lattice basis reduction one obtains a guess for ݇ ଵ .
We now set ܷ ᇱ = ݇ ଵ and ‫′‬ = ܽ ଵ and computes ܷ′ܽ mod ‫′‬ for 2 ≤ ݅ ≤ ݊. This is a superincreasing sequence. We then compute ܷ′ܿ mod ‫′‬ for any challenge ciphertext ܿ that is decrypted using the superincreasing sequence, and therefore message is recovered.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF HWANG ET AL.'S CRYPTOSYSTEM
Hwang's cryptosystem is based on the Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem. In the key generation stage, each user chooses a superincreasing sequence ‫ܤ‬ = ሼܾ ଵ , … , ܾ ଵଷ ሽ as secret key. 
Further, each user chooses a random 170× 256 binary matrix H, a vector ܴ = ‫ݎ(‬ ଵ , … , ‫ݎ‬ ଶହ ) ் and a vector ‫ܴܪ‬ = (ℎ‫ݎ‬ ଵ , … , ℎ‫ݎ‬ ଵ )
் to satisfy the following equation:
Let H(. ) be a one-way hash function. The public key is ‫,ܣ(‬ ܴ) and the private key is ‫,ܪ(‬ ‫,ܤ‬ ܹ, ܹ ᇱ , ܲ). They present a permutation algorithm and want this algorithm to ensure the security of the cryptosystem. The permutation algorithm is as follows: 1) Define an original sequence
2) Recombine all the elements of the original sequence ‫ܦ‬ which obtain (݊! − 1) sequences ‫ܦ‬ ଵ , . . . , ‫ܦ‬ (!ିଵ) . The sequences ‫ܦ‬ (݅ = 1, 2, … , ݊! − 1) are defined as follows: Let ܷ = ܹ ିଵ mod ܲ. We have
We can solve simultaneous diophantine approximation, as described in section III, and find a pair of integers (ܷ′, ܲ′) such that ܷ ᇱ /ܲ′ is close to ܷ/ܲ. With this pairs, we can now compute integers
which form a superincreasing sequence. This sequence can then be used in place of to secret key vector ‫ܤ‬ = (ܾ ଵ , … , ܾ ଵଷ ).
On the other hand, we can eavesdrop pair ‫ܦ(‬ ᇱ , ‫)ܥ‬ from insecure channel and hence we can compute factorial carry value ܷ = ሼ‫ݑ‬ ଵ , ‫ݑ‬ ଶ , … , ‫ݑ‬ ଵ ሽ of ‫′ܦ‬ where
We divide recovered pseudo secret key vector ‫ܤ‬ ′ = ሼܾ′ ଵ , … , ܾ′ ଵଷ ሽ into 8 subset public key vectors: Note that ‫ݑܽ‬ × ܷ ′ mod ܲ′ = ‫ݑ′ܾ‬ . Since ሼܾ′‫ݑ‬ ଵ , ‫ݑ′ܾ‬ ଶ , … , ‫ݑ′ܾ‬ ଵଶସ ሽ is a superincreasing sequence, we can solve this easy knapsack problem for 1 ≤ ݇ ≤ ݆ and therefore we can obtain the message ‫ܯ‬ = ሼ‫ܯ‬ ଵ , ‫ܯ‬ ଶ , … , ‫ܯ‬ ሽ.
VI. CONCLUSION
We considered a new knapsack-based PKC scheme. This scheme uses a permutation algorithm in the encryption phase to avoid the low density attack by keeping the density high. As we showed, this scheme is vulnerable, since like original Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem uses a superincreasing sequence as private key and attempt to hide this sequence with modular multiplication. But as Shamir showed, the modular multiplication cannot perfectly hide the superincreasing sequence. To avoid this attack, we can choose another easy knapsack problem, for example, like this presented in [18] or we do not use modular multiplication to produce the public key.
